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The 2016 election of Donald J. Trump irrevocably changed the course of 
American democracy by revealing the malevolent soft power of disinformation warfare 
in the American electoral system. Russian troll accounts operated by artificial 
intelligence bots systematically targeted voters on behalf of Mr. Trump to alter behavior 
and elicit polarizing reactions, cultivating his campaign of fearmongering and racism. 
Voters of color in key battleground districts—which won Mr. Trump the Electoral 
College—were marginalized through campaigns slandering Hillary Clinton’s record 
with Black and Latinx voters. The 2019 special counsel report by Robert Mueller 
confirmed that Russian disinformation Internet trolls worked to sow discord within the 
American public in the 2016 election—but what does this reveal about the sustainable 
future of the United States’ democracy as technology continues evolving? What do 
these campaigns reveal about the targeted audience for foreign actors and consulting 
firms?  
Through my research, I aim to correlate the history of disinformation with the 





impact of the Russian disinformation social media schemes in 2016, I will suggest 
techniques to better improve the sanctity of the electoral system. In a world continually 
fighting towards digital freedoms and data liberties, the United States must protect its 
citizens from election interference—without these precautions, hacking an election will 
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I. An Introduction 
We knew the 14 million people we needed to win 270. We targeted those 
in over 1000 different universes with exactly the things that mattered to 
them… We won exactly where we laid our money…Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio.  
- Brad Parscale, digital director of the 2016 Trump campaign.1  
American Politics in 2021 
Democracy in the United States is in crisis. Between 2016 and 2021, the Capitol 
was sieged, an election was widely questioned by prominent lawmakers, and internal 
strife threatened to deteriorate any semblance of peace. Nationalism plagues American 
society, while the leftwing policy agenda of progressives has fueled conservative fears 
of an ever-growing government. And while an emergent population of Americans are 
adamant about dismantling racist institutions and finding reparations for Black 
Americans, a not-so-silent minority works towards preserving the historical legacies of 
slavery and Jim Crow. This profound division elevates political animosity to a level 
unseen in the United States since the Civil War.2  
How did we get here? What led to the deep division between Americans on the 
left and right? Despite one’s political affiliation or personal opinion of the Trump 
administration, the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump is widely regarded as the boiling 
point of contemporary American strife.3 His administration marked a new chapter in 
Conservative politics and instigated a party realignment rapidly shifting mainstream 
Republican ideologies.  
                                                        
1 Institute of Politics, Harvard Kennedy School. Campaign for President.  
2 Paisley, Laura. “Political polarization.” 2016.  




The 2016 election was not an independent shift in American politics. Robert 
Mueller’s 2019 special counsel investigation concluded that the Russian government 
successfully interfered in the election, heavily influencing Trump’s eventual victory.4 
Mueller’s report found that that the Russian government interfered in the election in 
three primary ways: creating social media bots to spread disinformation, hacking the 
Democratic National Committee, and hacking into local government electoral offices. 
While the Mueller Report found that all three methods contributed to Trump’s victory, 
Russian weaponization of social media for disinformation marked a new era of 
government technology. Russia had been interfering in presidential and parliamentary 
elections globally since 1991, but never before had it advanced cyberattack technology 
in such a sophisticated and disturbing proportion.5 Rather than chasing the market and 
lagging behind technology’s rapid evolution, the Russian government championed 
malicious artificial intelligence (AI). These disinformation campaigns were used as 
information warfare to alter people’s individual votes, but also to incite polarizing 
reactions.6 By enabling more votes for Trump and cultivating his cult-like, alt-right 
rhetoric, Russian agents sought to create further systemic division in American politics.  
As a political scientist interested in emerging technologies, the Trump election 
prompted a series of questions for my own scholarship. How has technology impacted 
democratic elections? What did the Russian disinformation campaigns reveal about the 
Kremlin’s short-term and long-term interests in the United States? And what can be 
done to safeguard the sanctity of future democratic elections around the world from 
                                                        
4 Mueller, Robert. Report on The Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016. 2019.  
5 Kamarck, Elaine. Malevolent soft power, AI, and the threat to democracy. 2018.  




technical interference? This thesis attempts to bridge these questions and examine how 
disinformation spread through AI technologies, fulfilling a Russian interest in 
instigating animosity and internal strife in the United states.   
2016 Election Interference 
While Mueller was unable to determine Trump’s potential involvement in the 
Russian scheme, reporters linked Trump’s adversaries and campaign officials to 
Cambridge Analytica, a consulting firm that used leaked Facebook data to create 
individualized social media bots for most American voters to influence their political 
leanings in 2016.7 The artificially intelligent robots gained insight from gargantuan 
databases of detailed personal data mined from Facebook to better target individual 
voters. While the precise number of bots operating in 2016 is still unknown, experts 
estimate that Cambridge Analytica created 220 million profiles for the bots to target.8  
These bots seemingly worked in tandem with the Russian disinformation bots—they 
both were personalized to individual voters, created to incite division, and succeeded at 
targeting key voters to influence swing districts.9 While Russia faced little backlash for 
its interference tactics, Cambridge Analytica came under global scrutiny for its 
nefarious use of Facebook’s data and led to many public officials interrogating the role 
of Big Tech in electoral politics.  
My research will prove that these disinformation programs contributed to 
amplified national division. These technologies mobilized foundational Conservative 
voters—Evangelical Christians and rightwing veterans—to arrive in droves at the ballot 
                                                        
7 Rosenberg, Matthew, et al. “How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions.”  
8 Bergdahl, Jacob. “How AI Can Make You the President.” 2019.  




box. They demobilized Black voters by spreading disinformation regarding Hillary 
Clinton’s record with the Black Lives Matter campaigns and law enforcement policies. 
And the bots helped shift frustrated young progressives away from the Democratic base, 
instead voting for the Green Party’s candidate, Jill Stein.10  
These disinformation schemes revealed the malevolent soft power of artificial 
intelligence in the American electoral system. While the public may view the tech 
industry as a space filled by social media companies and Internet conglomerates, few 
understand the dark underbelly of these emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence 
remains essentially unregulated and unmonitored in 2021, despite its emergent role in 
everyday life. From online shopping to insurance quotes, artificial intelligence and 
machine learning technologies increasingly interact with users on an incredibly regular 
basis—typically multiple times each day. By wielding and dominating these 
technologies, the Russian government controlled the most insidious contemporary 
weapon against American democratic institutions to date. 
Methodology and Terminology  
Throughout the course of my thesis, I relied upon a wide plethora of prominent 
pundits in political science, computer science, and communications. These experts came 
from diverse backgrounds—many were investigative journalists, intelligence experts, 
academics, pollsters, programmers, or legal theorists. While I primarily synthesized and 
evaluated the findings of each of them in this piece, they conducted several various 
methods within their own research that is worth discussing.  
                                                        




A significant portion of my thesis relied upon Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s book, 
Cyberwar. Jamieson, an acclaimed communications scholar from the University of 
Pennsylvania, conducted several telephone surveys, ultimately interviewing 2,021 U.S. 
adults during the 2016 election season to garner national opinions on Donald Trump 
and Hillary Clinton. These survey results were merged to test the aggregate differences 
within audiences, thus beginning to understand how media messaging shaped the way 
many adults viewed the candidates.11 Similar polling methods were utilized by experts 
at the Pew Research Center, the New York Times, and NBC News, three institutions that 
aided my scholarship.  
Many of the political scientists I evaluated utilized a process tracing 
methodology in their research. I framed much of my research around Elaine 
Kamarack’s report, Malevolent soft power, AI, and the threat to democracy, published 
by the Brookings Institution. Kamarack used case studies to link possible causes of 
disinformation with observed outcomes of the 2016 election.12 As did Adam Casey and 
Lucan Ahmad Way, two academics from the University of Toronto who collected 
evidence of Russian electoral interventions from 1991–2017.13 Process tracing was a 
particularly useful method of analysis, as it allowed researchers to contextualize 
disinformation hypotheses with the real outcome of the election. 
Most notably, I considered several congressional reports within my thesis as 
well. These reports—including the 2020 Select Committee on Intelligence report and 
the Mueller investigation report—utilized intelligence that would otherwise be 
                                                        
11 Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Cybercrime. 2018. 
12 Kamarack. 




inaccessible to me as a private citizen.14 Many of the details around the 2016 election 
remain classified by foreign intelligence officials, state agencies, and tech companies.15 
This data was consequential to my research and allowed me to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the disinformation campaigns, their effect on the American public, and 
what they symbolized for Russian foreign policy.  
Paradigms in My Research 
I also utilized a behaviorist model of analysis. Based on psychology, 
behaviorism postulates that human behavior is constantly conditioned by the media we 
ingest and our personal histories. In other words, humans will likely act in a similar way 
to the television shows, books, music, movies, periodicals, or social media they 
regularly consume, as long as it aligns with their historical experiences.16 For example, 
a left-leaning woman who reads liberal newspapers and has experienced sexism in her 
lifetime is more likely to support a new bill created by a popular male Democrat, as the 
media she interacts with suggests that the politician is a feminist. Behaviorism theory 
argues that these conditions are manipulatable under a precise understanding of each 
person’s identity and media consumption. If an instigator deeply understands a victim, it 
can easily influence the victim’s actions.17  
And finally, it is essential to distinguish between misinformation and 
disinformation. While misinformation is false information spread without poor intent, 
disinformation is deliberately biased and incorrect information spread to mislead 
                                                        
14 Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures. 2020 
15 Mueller. 
16 Staats, A. W. Social Behaviorism. 1975.  




others.18 In the case of the 2016 election, I will be referring to the fake news created by 
the AI bot accounts as ‘disinformation’ because they were designed maliciously.19 
  
                                                        
18 Think of disinformation as a subsect of misinformation, just with a different intention behind it.  
19 While not essential to define, it’s important to remember that many of the articles and posts created by 
AI were later shared by real people on their real accounts. In these cases, the disinformation would 
transform into misinformation, as many of the users were unaware that the information was inaccurate 




II. Literature Review 
Civic technology—and its subsequent academic scholarship—is an ever-
emerging field, but still considerably neglected in computer science research. Between 
1998 and 2018, the number of peer-reviewed journal entries on artificial intelligence 
has expanded more than 300%, now accounting for 3% of peer-reviewed computer 
science journal publications.20 While there is a growing body of work focusing on 
politics and artificial intelligence, this remains significantly smaller than other topics in 
the academic field of computer science. Many academics study how artificial 
intelligence affects advertising, automobiles, or law enforcement, but only a handful 
discuss political science and elections.21 This is not new; political science and civic 
society has rarely been discussed in conversation with computer engineering, much less 
artificial intelligence. However, as the federal government begins exploring the 
capabilities of technological innovation in the public sphere, academic research 
followed suit.22 A small, but growing, body of politically oriented computer science 
scholarship has emerged from policy researchers and legal scholars, intent to study how 
technology can alter or enhance civil rights. This was a significant portion of the 
literature I utilized in my research, in addition to other interdisciplinary sources from 
communications, law, and policy fields.  
Each year, Stanford Law School’s Freeman Spogli Institute in the Cyber Policy 
Center conducts an Index Report tracking and visualizing data related to artificial 
intelligence. This report is broad, focusing on several chapters of AI use, as well as 
                                                        
20 Perrault, Raymond et al. “The AI Index.” 2019.  





public perceptions and societal considerations. Most notably, the 2019 Index reported 
that the most dominant topics associated with AI in that year were data privacy and 
ethics—typically defined through fairness, interpretability, and explainability.23 These 
characterizations are often mentioned in AI applications to economics, education, the 
workforce, and the government.24 This is an encouraging trend, as it suggests that the 
public and private sectors are beginning to address how AI can be used to promote civil 
rights, as well as disenfranchise marginalized communities. 
To first learn about how AI affected the 2016 election, I turned to the 2018 
Brookings Institute report, Malevolent soft power, AI, and the threat to democracy.25 
This report, authored by Senior Fellow Elaine Kamarck, describes Russian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. election but also highlights similar disinformation interferences in the 
United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, and elections in the Ukraine, Scotland, Austria, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain.26 By examining data from 1991 through 2017, Russia 
has proved to regularly interfere in presidential and parliamentary elections around the 
world, beginning by offering electoral funding support and then evolving into cyber-
attacks and artificial intelligence bot production.27 Kamarack’s report compared these 
methods to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, drawing note to key counties 
successfully targeted by Russian trolls. 
                                                        
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Kamarck. 
26 Ibid. 




Another incredibly useful publication was Cybercrime, by Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson. This book, published in 2018, describes the initial findings regarding 
Russia’s involvement in the 2016 election, and how they utilized disinformation warfare 
to erode democratic norms and elect Donald Trump. Jamieson’s book is an extensive 
insight into the ongoing investigations, while also clarifying how disinformation acts as 
a form of mind control.28  Jamieson is effective because she presented conclusive, 
sound data to prove how voting changed due to disinformation, as well as what these 
tactics meant for civil society as a whole. I relied upon her work as a foundational start 
for my own scholarship, which suggested policies to safeguard the election process and 
protect against disinformation.  
Many of my other sources were academics and researchers. As civic technology 
blossoms into an emerging field of research, universities and think tanks employ an 
array of experts working to establish new digital freedom norms worldwide. These 
institutions are leading the fight against electoral disinformation, and published reports 
essential to my research. The Oxford Internet Institute, operated in conjunction with 
Oxford University, is one of the most prominent centers considering how technology 
interacts with the public sphere. Samuel Woolley and Douglas Guilbeault first reported 
on Russian disinformation in their 2017 report, Computational Propaganda in the 
United States of America: Manufacturing Consensus Online. This study was one of the 
foundational works examining the power of disinformation in the 2016 election.29 
Another report from the Brookings Institute, Ethical algorithm design should guide 
                                                        
28 Jamieson.  




technology regulation, helped inform my proposals to improve technical governance.30 
Additionally, I interviewed Brenda Leong and Sara Jordan from the Freedom of Privacy 
Foundation, who helped me understand the technical side of disinformation and how 
legislation can better impact algorithms.31   
Furthermore, I greatly utilized research from the Pew Research Center. Many of 
these polls contained fantastic data that helped contextualize public opinion on the 2016 
campaign, the partisan divide, and voter turnout each year. Pew’s data informed my 
analysis on religious voters,32 on the partisan divide before and after Trump’s 
presidency,33 and the actual voter turnout in 2016.34  
I also relied upon congressional hearings, reports, and intelligence 
investigations. While these were not pieces of literature, they were through lines within 
many of the sources that I reviewed in my research. Most predominately, I analyzed 
data from the Special Counsel Mueller investigation, the 2020 Special Intelligence 
Committee report on Russian disinformation campaigns, and several hearings before the 
Senate intelligence committee between 2018 and 2020. Not only did these provide 
crucial data and intelligence reporting I would otherwise be unable to access, but they 
also captured the testimony of policymakers and prominent researchers.35 While all of 
my materials were highly reliable and accurate, these federal documents were the 
closest I came to accessing primary sources—they were the only documents with 
concurrent data insinuating the classified intelligence collected by federal officials.36   
                                                        
30 Kearns, Michael and Aaron Roth. Ethical algorithm design. 2020.  
31 Leong, Brenda and Sara Jordan. Interview. 2021. 
32 Pew Research Center. Faith and the 2016 campaign. 2016.  
33 Pew Research Center. The Partisan Divide. 2017. 
34 Pew Research Center. Voter Turnout by Population. 2016.  
35 Select Committee on Intelligence.  




When I was unable to find declassified information, I turned to investigative 
journalism. Experts at the New York Times, Politico Magazine, and Wired were some of 
the first journalists reporting on Russian disinformation campaigns, both in 2016 and in 
2020.37 Many of these articles contained screenshots and images of the actual 
disinformation spread on Facebook and Twitter—a large collection of which has been 
since deleted.38 Additionally, investigative journalism helped me draft a timeline of 
Russian disinformation interference in foreign campaigns.39  
Throughout my research, I relied upon a wide variety of literature. This helped 
me understand more comprehensively my research questions, but also granted me with 
an interdisciplinary perspective that was crucial to such a technical topic. Civic 
technology and Internet regulation is not merely an issue for policy makers, but they are 
complex topics with complex answers, ones which need to consider the legal, technical, 
and political implications. I only expect that civic technology research will proliferate in 
the years to come, much as these debates will experience similar growth alongside 
technical developments.  
                                                        
37 Sanger, David E. and Julian E. Barnes. “U.S. Warns Russia.” 2020.  
38 Robinson, Meyer. “The Grim Conclusions.” 2018.  




III. How Electoral Misinformation Became Disinformation 
Before discussing the 2016 election, it is important to note that electoral 
misinformation is not a novel concept. “Fake news” has plagued the public sphere since 
the printing press was invented in the early 15th century. From Galileo’s persecution by 
the Vatican to fabricated stories of sea monsters, the printing press allowed 
misinformation to rapidly proliferate and, for the first time, impact society.40 And as 
democracy slowly spread across the Western hemisphere, misinformation campaigns 
soon followed. Democratic governments particularly relied upon journalists and the 
media to inform the public on state matters, global affairs, and local issues—thus, 
reliable journalism is a crucial element to any well-functioning democracy.41  
History of Misinformation in the United States 
Objective journalism is a contemporary novelty in the United States, and only 
established in the early 20th century. Prior to the creation of the journalistic norms that 
we are familiar with today—like truthfulness and nonpartisan reliability—yellow 
journalism inundated the public sphere. Since the American Revolution, yellow 
journalism favored melodrama over factual accuracy, opting to profit rather than 
inform. Even Benjamin Franklin’s newspapers fabricated reports of King George III to 
increase hostility against the British.42 As the United States developed into a sovereign 
nation, yellow journalism grew more powerful and influential, like by initiating the 
Spanish-American War with contrived articles about Spain’s hostilities against Cuba.43  
                                                        
40 Doyle, Aine. “Tracing ‘Fake News:’” 2019.  
41 Soll, Jacob. “The Long and Brutal History.” 2016. 
42 Ibid.  




The model of objective journalism arose for a wide plethora of reasons in the 
1900s. Journalists began building reputations of trust and dependability through 
reputable publications, like the New York Times, and congressional encouragement. 
Throughout the 20th century, Americans learned of major government programs and 
scandals—like Watergate—because of investigative journalism and leaked federal 
documents. Yellow journalism faded away into tabloids and political news, largely 
dismissed by the America public and replaced with reliable sources.44 
However, misinformation lingered in the public sphere. Throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s, the U.S. government was highly concerned over ideological and nuclear 
threats from the Soviet Union. In April 1950, the National Security Council and State 
Department drafted the top-secret report NSC 68, which detailed the government’s 
concern about Communist misinformation and propaganda schemes.45  
NSC 68 described the fundamental difference between the Kremlin and the U.S. 
government. The Kremlin represented the antithesis of traditional American values like 
freedom and liberty, instead signifying a “slave state” which “eliminate the [civilian] 
challenge of freedom” against the government.46 This iron curtain polarized the Soviets 
from every Western democracy, automatically creating global tension and concern for 
violence. NSC 68 expressed concern for nuclear attack, but also for an insidious 
violation of American ideals. It described that: 
Every institution of our society is an instrument which it is sought to 
stultify and turn against our purposes. Those that touch most closely our 
material and moral strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, 
civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing 
opinion. The effort is not so much to make them serve obvious Soviet 
                                                        
44 Ibid.  
45 Miller, Jennifer M. “Democracy and Misinformation.” 2019.  




ends as to prevent them from serving our ends, and thus to make them 
sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our body politic.47 
Here, the report is identifying a clear concern for domestic misinformation campaigns 
by the Kremlin, which could also be characterized as information warfare. While the 
Soviet Union worked to create corporeal weapons of mass destruction, it simultaneously 
enacted verbal campaigns to deteriorate the fabric of American society. By integrating 
Soviet propaganda on a wide scale, the misinformation threatened to “increase anxiety 
and defeatism in all the free world.”48 NSC 68 laid foundation for McCarthyism and 
Cold War politics that further exacerbated a rise of division in the public sphere.49  
This foundation led to the Central Intelligence Agency’s 1967 Operation 
Mockingbird. Originally beginning in the early 50s, Operation Mockingbird partnered 
the federal government with American journalists and media sources to influence public 
opinion. The CIA sought to counter Soviet misinformation with American propaganda 
by secretly sponsoring over 400 reporters and editors to publish anti-communist 
articles.50 These articles were published in the New York Times, Washington Post, and 
other highly regarded, nonpartisan periodicals. Many of these disinformation articles 
were written after surveilling anti-war activists and individuals believed to be associated 
with the communist party, primarily to better target similar populations.51  
It is important to note that the American federal government has conducted 
misinformation campaigns in foreign countries for decades. This foreign policy is not 
uncommon—most large states attempt to influence international elections with overt or 
                                                        
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Miller. 





covert support of a favorable candidate. The United States has spread misinformation in 
El Salvador, Panama, Venezuela, Iran, and many other foreign states to help pro-U.S. 
candidates.52 As Michael Sulmeyer, a senior director for cybersecurity at the United 
States Cyber Command, stated, “America lives in the glassiest of glass houses.”53 Cyber 
interference in foreign elections has only proliferated since the beginning of the 21st 
century, but what distinguishes U.S. actions from the Russian 2016 interference is a 
mastery of emerging technology unseen before.  
Russian Misinformation Campaigns  
The foreign intelligence community first identified evidence of Russian 
interference in Western elections in 1994. Originally, Russian officials focused on 
interfering with elections in former Soviet Union states—primarily Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Moldova—and assisted candidates that tended to be more nationalistic, 
conservative, and supportive of the Russian agenda.54 At the time, Western Europe was 
recovering from the Cold War and the rupturing of the Soviet Union. Many of the 
former Soviet states were adjusting to the new normal of geopolitics, and soon had to 
decide between drawing allegiances with the European Union or Russia. To promote 
Russian regional authority, the Russian government began covertly interfering in many 
of these early elections in newly independent countries.55 Russian agents shared articles 
favoring their selected candidates and spread misinformation through media and 
community organizing. In 1994, the Russian government provided support for Leonid 
                                                        
52 Ibid.  
53 Sanger, David E. and Nicole Perlroth. “Trump Contradicts Pompeo.” 2020. 
54 Casey and Way. 




Kuchma, a politician challenging Ukraine’s first President, Leonid Kravuchuk. While 
Kuchma’s term was defined by corruption and scandal, he promoted Russian policy and 
worked to reshape the nascent country into a state reliant upon Putin and his power. In 
short, the clandestine misinformation campaigns worked.56  
Over the next decade, Russian agents continued manipulating the results of 
Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldovan elections, but often with very minimal tangible 
results. While the misinformation schemes worked for Kuchma, all of the other 
politicians did little to advance Russian agendas or promote Russian regional authority. 
Subsequently, the Russian interference campaigns evolved in 2004. Instead of covertly 
supporting candidates through misinformation campaigns, the Russian government 
additionally massively funded politicians for further advantage. When Kuchma stepped 
down from the Ukrainian presidency in 2004 and named Yanukovych as his successor, 
the Russian government provided between $50 and $600 million to Yanukovych’s 
campaign.57 Despite Yanukovych’s ultimate electoral loss, the Russians began 
transforming their role in electoral politics. Soon, the Kremlin continued providing 
massive amounts of funds to politicians, promising to lower gas prices if they win, and 
publicly urging state media sources to distribute misinformation on the candidate’s 
behalf.58  
The Kremlin first used cyberwarfare in the 2014 Ukrainian election. In an 
attempt to disrupt and falter the Presidential election, Russian operatives spawned a 
series of coordinated cyberattacks dismantling the election. These attacks faked voter 
                                                        
56 Ibid.  
57 Tolstrup, Jakob. “Black knights and elections.” 2014. 




totals and integrated malware into state servers to completely revert the election 
results.59 This proved unsuccessful; the election continued, and an anti-Putin candidate 
won office. However, these cyberattacks laid the foundation for future interference, and 
shifted towards a more contemporary way of spreading misinformation through 
cyberwarfare. Foreign intelligence gathering found that similar hacking techniques were 
used in 2015, when Russia expanded out of Western Europe and interfered in British 
and German elections for the first time.60 
However, everything changed in 2016. Russian operatives interfered in elections 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Montenegro, Italy, 
Bulgaria, and Austria, proving its interest in dominating not only regional authority, but 
establishing a global power over Western states.61 By creating and implementing a new 
form of cyberattack—AI social media bots—the Kremlin was able to spread 
disinformation at a massive scale unseen before. In the days leading to the Brexit 
referendum, over 150,000 Twitter accounts owned by Russian users posted tens of 
thousands of messages in English that supported Brexit and spread faulty accounts of 
politicians and celebrities that supposedly voted to leave.62 In the Netherlands, Russia 
instigated a disinformation campaign for a referendum modifying Ukrainian 
membership in the European Union. Media outlets run by Russian operatives, like 
Sputnik and RT, shared incorrect articles prompting Dutch readers to widely criticize 
Ukraine.63 And in Bulgaria, journalists located a document proposing a Russian-
                                                        
59 Le Miere, Jason. “Russia Election Hacking.” 2017.  
60 Reinhold, Fabian. “Germany Prepares.” 2017.  
61 Casey and Way.  
62 Kirkpatrick, David. “Signs of Russian Meddling.” 2017.  




sponsored victory plan for the Socialist Party to “plant fake news and promote 
exaggerated polling data” to ensure that “the party emphasize issues that dovetailed 
with Kremlin policy: calling for an end to Russian sanctions, criticizing NATO and 
talking up the UK’s vote to leave the EU.”64 While the exact number of fake news 
accounts operating within Bulgaria remains unknown, the Socialist Party’s candidate, 
Rumen Radev, won the presidency and strengthened ties with Russia.  
While Russian meddling began as a way to dominate regional authority, they 
transformed into an effort for global power. In 1998, former KGB Major General Oleg 
Kalugin described Russian disinformation as “the heart and soul of Soviet intelligence,” 
stating that it was  
not intelligence collection, but subversion; active measures to weaken 
the West, to drive wedges in the Western community alliances of all 
sorts, particularly NATO; to sow discord among allies, to weaken the 
United States in the eyes of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, and thus to prepare ground in case the war really occurs.65  
 
These campaigns prove that the Kremlin is actively attempting to dismantle the 
European Union, minimalize the United States’ role in global politics, and create a new 
global environment fit for Russian dominance. They are achieving this through 
supporting Nationalistic, inflammatory politicians that embody a potential to build or 
reinforce connections with the Russian government.66 This is not a whimsical support of 
a specific individual—it is a long-term scheme to control global politics and dismantle 
the current world order.  
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By influencing Brexit, helping Donald Trump, and dismantling the voter bases of 
Angela Merkel, the Kremlin is exposing its intentions for chaos and making it easy to 
guess its next steps: whatever serves their best interest.67  
  
                                                        




IV. Transitioning Technology 
The Invention of the Internet 
First invented in the early 1970s, the Internet began as a Department of Defense 
program for academic communication in an attempt to further protect national security. 
After the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik spacecraft in 1957, the American 
government feared that they were conducting widespread surveillance on American 
citizens.68 The government, in an attempt to better secure the country against Soviet 
interference, funded the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), a project by the 
Department of Defense to facilitate communication between scientists across the 
country. By 1969, ARPANET was created—a system of computers across the West 
Coast that could communicate and work together through the Internet.69 Despite 
operating through public and private universities across the United States, ARPANET 
remained operated by the Department of Defense until 1983. The rise of global 
computer operating companies, like Intel and Microsoft, quickly projected the nascent 
Internet into a popularized technology with personal computers in the late 1980s. By 
then, the Internet was a bare-boned tool, primarily used for word processing and 
software programs in professional environments.70  
The Internet exponentially grew during the 1990s, resembling what we are more 
familiar with today. After the World Wide Web was developed in 1989, companies 
rapidly shifted onto online platforms. Soon, the electronic mail would be invented, 
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enabling individuals to use the Internet for personal and social matters for the first 
time.71  
 It is important to note that the Internet is different from the Web or the cloud—it 
is a system of digital wires. The Internet is an elaborate and colossal infrastructure of 
global networks, all connected through wires existing in cyberspace. When someone 
accesses the Internet, they are logging onto their own private wire that is automatically 
networked to every single other Internet-accessing device in the world. The Web, which 
is easily accessed on every computer, is built above the Internet, and operates as a portal 
to different sites. When individuals hack online, they hack into both the operating 
systems as well as sites accessible through the Web.72  
The Rise of Social Networking Sites 
Social media has existed throughout modern history, only in different forms than 
we are familiar with today. Periodicals and magazines have operated in similar fashions 
as today’s major companies, like Facebook and Twitter—before the Industrial 
Revolution, these media brought news and stories into communities, allowing 
individuals to connect with one another by extensive means. Social media first shifted 
onto an electronic platform in 1844, when the telegraph was first invented. Samuel 
Morse’s invention was rudimentary compared to contemporary social media sites, but 
operated in a shockingly similar matter, complete with popularized acronyms similar to 
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today’s digital slang.73 “G M” meant “good morning” and “S F D” stood for “stop for 
dinner.”74  
Despite the popularity of telegraph communications, social media websites first 
appeared online as the Internet grew more mainstream in the late 20th century. A 
plethora of digital communication sites—like CompuServe, America Online, and 
Prodigy—allowed users to connect with and talk to other users across the country, 
riding the success of widely popular e-mail technology. Six Degrees, created in 1997, 
and Friendster, launched in 2001, were the first two social media platforms where users 
were able to upload personalized profiles to facilitate digital networking, rather than just 
messaging others. Later, in 2002, LinkedIn launched for early career professionals to 
connect, digitally network, and find jobs. Despite the prevalence of these sites, they 
remained somewhat unpopular on the mainstream Web.75   
Myspace was the catalyst for the social media frenzy. Launched in 2003, 
Myspace rapidly became the most trafficked website globally. Users praised the unique 
ability to upload music, artwork, and writing on the site, prompting more 
personalization of each profile. Myspace was the first mainstream social media platform 
and revolutionized the way users interacted online.76 
But in 2004, Mark Zuckerberg invented Facebook and permanently changed the 
Internet. Originally designed as Facemash in 2003, Zuckerberg created a site to vote on 
the attractiveness of different female students at Harvard University. Facemash gained 
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massive popularity, and Zuckerberg transformed it into “The Facebook” in 2004. The 
Facebook became a global site with individual profiles for users to meet other college 
students. Its distinguishing factor was its timeline function, allowing users to post status 
updates and messages available to each of their Facebook friends.77 
Since 2004, social media has taken over the world. Today, Facebook is used by 
1.7 billion people worldwide.78 YouTube is used by 73% of adults in the United States, 
while seven-in-ten adults operate Facebook accounts.79 Instagram, now owned by 
Facebook, has more than 1 billion global users.80 Twitter has instigated social 
revolutions in the Middle East and helped spread crucial political messaging in the past 
decade.81 And most recently, TikTok has grown in popularity, resulting in more than 
800 million users worldwide.82  
As social media continues to evolve, as does its role in society. Like other forms 
of technology, social media companies have remained relatively unregulated since their 
creation. However, as technology thinktanks proliferate and pundits consider the role of 
technology in modern America, many individuals are questioning the unchecked power 
of big tech. Facebook consistently buys out its competitors, including Instagram and 
WhatsApp, seeking to dominate the social networking market. Meanwhile, TikTok 
faces enhanced scrutiny for its ties to the Chinese government and its secret data 
collection projects. With a new presidential administration in 2021, increased calls in 
the public sphere to scale back large social media companies, and widespread advocacy 
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for data privacy regulations, the tech industry will only remain as a prevalent and 
influential presence around the world.83  
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
Science aficionados—both professional and recreational—have obsessed over 
robots since the beginning of the Information Era in the early 20th century. As Internet 
technologies evolved and complexified, computer scientists searched for ways to create 
artificially intelligent robots using programming. British polymath Alan Turing first 
instigated the AI thought experiment by considering the mathematical likelihood an 
intelligent machine could reason in 1950.84 Unfortunately, without the Internet, there 
was no way computers could store and maintain commands independently. While 
Turing’s experiment failed, it inspired Logic Theorist, a program by Allen Newell, Cliff 
Shaw, and Herbert Simon widely considered the first AI program ever created. Logic 
Theorist proved that AI was achievable, even if it needed an additional twenty years of 
research to succeed.85  
As technology developed, artificial intelligence followed suit. By the 1980s, 
$400 million was invested by the Japanese government to revolutionize machine 
learning and AI capabilities.86 Edward Feigenbaum invented expert systems, a 
technological process where a computer mimicked the deliberation process of a human 
expert. By 1997, AI chess computer programs were beating global grandmasters, speech 
recognition software was widely used on Windows computers, and a robot could detect 
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and simulate human emotions.87 In the early 2000s, computers gained the capacity to 
store profoundly more data, opening even more doors for AI research and capabilities. 
Today, artificial intelligence is widely used in less glamorous manners. Banking, 
marketing, media, and insurance companies regularly use machine learning and AI tools 
in their outreach programs. Many of the phishing calls received are instigated by AI 
bots, and most commercial companies rely upon robot receptionists instead of human 
agents. Technology companies employ highly advanced algorithms to precisely track 
people’s digital footprints, only strengthening their AI capabilities.88 By championing 
big data networks and machine learning trees, AI continues gaining rapid amounts of 
momentum across the Web.  
What’s Next?  
With the emergence of driverless cars, real-time language translations, and 
digital doctors, artificial intelligence and technological interference in everyday life will 
only continue snowballing. Finally, lawmakers are beginning to adjust to the new 
normal: tech is not slowing down. Ethical questions, like who should govern the 
Internet and what the best guidelines are for AI, are being discussed to a greater extent 
than ever before. Agencies around the world are championing digital rights, advocating 
for widespread data privacy and open-sourced platforms promoting ethical AI.89 And by 
interrogating the power of Facebook, Google, and Amazon, the U.S. government has 
begun defining the federal role in maintaining these systems. 
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However, the American government still does not have a national policy for data 
protection. Without concrete and extensive regulations online, the Internet is an 
ambiguous cyberspace lacking clear jurisdictions. This is a huge problem: The United 
States simply does not have a good technology policy. After the European Union passed 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, nations around the globe 
raced to meet the budding norm for citizen data rights.90 Instead of a broad piece of 
national legislation, the United States has a mélange of state and federal laws providing 
different frameworks of digital privacy. Recently, California passed the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the most progressive U.S. Internet policy to date.91 To 
dismantle the sweeping power of big technology companies, Congress must also build 
legislation similar to CCPA, ensuring the needs of the consumer are always protected. 
Until then, the monopoly of tech power will remain unrestrained.   
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V. Algorithms of Control 
At their core, algorithms are a set of rules that dictate how a computer program 
operates. They are dynamic and designed to personalize content for users on most 
websites, including Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Instagram. These lines of code are 
the reason why search results are tailored to what you have visited before, why 
YouTube can recommend similar creators to what you already subscribe to, and why 
your Facebook feed always tends to show updates from the profiles you interact with 
most before other posts.92 Algorithms help the Web function as a complex, personable, 
and accessible space, but they also easily lead to abuse and corruption. By deeply 
understanding the nature of algorithms, individuals and organizations can attempt to 
persuade users to buy a product, learn about a topic, or vote for a politician.93  
It is important to note that algorithms on highly visited websites are already 
designed to customize content to each user. There are a variety of motivations behind 
this: a commerce site might want to tailor its marketing more directly, or search engine 
might desire to have its results already directed towards what a user is interested in. But 
for social media websites, these algorithms are designed for continuous user 
engagement. As Woodrow Hartzog, a law professor specializing in computer science at 
Northeastern University, described, “if you want to know when social media companies 
are trying to manipulate you into disclosing information or engaging more, the answer 
is always.”94 Feeds are designed to constantly provide new content and capture a user’s 
attention for a long period of time, therefore confining them to the social media app and 
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promoting continued use. From the profiles recommended to the posts prioritized in a 
user’s feed, an app’s algorithm curates a formidable vortex designed purely for its 
addictiveness.95 These vortexes operate as separate communities, spaces, and 
ecosystems dominated by other users with similar likes, interests, and ideologies. 
Typically, users are surrounded by other like-minded accounts, almost totally unaware 
of what occurs in different online ecosystems.96  
In many ways, digital footprints have transformed from minute, passive 
identities into significant representations of who a person is, what they believe in, and 
how they define themselves. Someone’s presence online is more than their Amazon 
browsing history or news website preference: each minute data point acts as a tiny piece 
to a huge, all-encompassing puzzle.97 Algorithms use these dismissed data points to 
power their operations, ultimately to deeply and complexly understand what makes a 
user unique and distinct.98 
By controlling these algorithms, a programmer can essentially control a user’s 
digital world. They can dictate which communities and spaces a user’s account operates 
within, and which content they end up exposed to and receptive towards. Without our 
knowledge, these digital worlds end up more influential than tangible, real-life 
communities outside of cyberspace. And by controlling the content that a user sees and 
interacts with, a hacker or programmer can begin to change the way they view and think 
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of the world. They cannot control their physical mind, but they can begin controlling or 
shaping a user’s digital one. And often, that can be more influential than we may like to 
believe.  
 Behind every algorithm is a coder or programmer that is writing that algorithm 
for a purpose. That person’s biases, preconceptions, and interests are translated through 
their algorithm, similar to any other form of writing or self-expression.99 For many 
social media sites, the algorithm’s purpose is to consume a user’s attention span and 
prevent them from leaving the app. But for individuals with nefarious interests, or 
criminal motivations, controlling the algorithm becomes an important tool in converting 
new audiences.100   
                                                        
99 An interesting debate emerging from this area is how racism and bigotry is encoded in many 
algorithms. Facial recognition software, job application programs, and home security systems have all 
been subject of scrutiny by operating already prejudiced against people of color. While this debate is not 
entirely relevant to my thesis, it is worth noting as another way computer science and technology interacts 
with civil liberties and digital freedom. 




VI. The 2016 Election 
The Mueller Report formally acknowledged in the public sphere that the 
Russian government manipulated and interfered in the 2016 Presidential election.101 
However, even after a Special Counsel investigation and calls to break up Big Tech 
social media companies, the consequences of Russian involvement remain vague and 
abstract in the public sphere. Little is understood regarding the motivations of the 
Russian government, what Donald Trump’s involvement might have been, or what 
exact impact the AI bots had on voter turnout and the election’s results. But considering 
the history of Russian disinformation interference in democratic elections illustrates the 
Kremlin’s desire to discredit Western democracies through political violence, increased 
partisanship, and irrevocable ideological divisions. As Senator Charles E. Grassley said 
in a 2017 Judiciary Committee hearing, “Russia does not have loyalty to a political 
party in the United States. Their goal is to divide us and discredit our democracy.”102  
By manipulating the 2016 election, the Russian government wanted to enshrine 
the U.S. electoral system with doubt and exacerbate preexisting discords of race and 
gender in American politics. This involvement was not unexpected; Vladimir Putin and 
Hillary Clinton were widely regarded as adversaries after her harsh criticism of Russia 
while Secretary of State.103 During the 2011 Russian election, Clinton sharply criticized 
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Putin’s victory and the Russian electoral system as a whole, supposedly showing 
American support for Putin’s political opponents and undermining his authority.104 
Meanwhile, Donald Trump showed potential to disrupt the status quo of 
American foreign policy and align domestic norms to more closely resemble those 
within Russia, particularly through reduced aid to Ukraine.105 Additionally, his business 
interests closely aligned with Russian economic prosperity. According to the 
declassified joint CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency report in 2017, “Putin and 
the Russian government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.”106 
The Kremlin intended to damage both Clinton’s campaign and the democratic process 
as a whole.  
What followed was a sophisticated campaign to sway the 2016 election. The 
intelligence community has identified several complex schemes used by Russian 
operatives to broadly attack the election. Specifically, they created campaigns that 
where:  
Russian intelligence and Kremlin-connected hackers infiltrated voting 
systems, leaked Clinton campaign emails to Wikileaks, created fake 
documents alongside real documents to Wikileaks, used Facebook pages 
to spread anti-immigrant propaganda, paid for pro-Trump Facebook ads, 
used Facebook to organize anti-immigrant protests in the US.107 
While all of these tactics highly impacted the 2016 election, the most disturbing and 
invasive was the infiltration of voting systems. Congressional and academic 
investigations found that the Russian infiltration of American voting systems was an 
elaborate and multifaceted attack. These programs were designed to shed doubt on the 
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electoral process as a whole, while igniting preexisting embers of oppression within 
American civil society.108  
Russia’s Information Warfare 
The Mueller investigation found evidence of the Russian government used 
disinformation to infiltrate the election in several ways. The Kremlin used paid “trolls” 
to create fake social media accounts that spread disinformation through state-sponsored 
propaganda, deep fakes, and fake news in United States cyber communities. Many of 
these accounts also marketed the WikiLeaks documents engineered by Russian 
officials. By weaponizing social media and spreading disinformation, the Russian 
government engaged in a new form of “information warfare” to “sow discord in the 
U.S. political system.”109 These accounts interacted with tens of millions of Americans 
on several social media platforms, attempted to “polarize Americans on the basis of 
societal, ideological, and racial differences,” and showed “covert support of Russia’s 
favored candidate in the U.S. presidential election.”110  
This attack was broad by design; the vast array of disinformation forms was 
purposefully diverse so that, at some point, the content would appear on a social media 
account of most Americans. It was a “firehouse of falsehoods” with “incredibly large 
volumes” and a “rapid, continuous, and repetitive” barrage of constant content 
generation.111 Furthermore, the Russian government engineered disinformation media 
that played off of preexisting partisan divides. This niche content was expertly crafted 
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to seamlessly integrate itself into each algorithm, thereby achieving a different goal 
based on that affected community. For evangelical Christians and veterans, state-
sponsored propaganda was widely spread through fake Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube accounts, resulting in a huge turnout on election day; Black voters were 
demobilized and pressured by fake “blacktivist” accounts to extract themselves from 
voting; and previous supporters of Bernie Sanders were encouraged to support Green 
Party candidate Jill Stein.112  
   
Figure 1: Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal and an engineered photo of 
comedian Aziz Ansari circulated by Russian operatives during the 2016 election.113 
The disinformation media created by Russia was used to extensively and 
unilaterally attack American voters. By flooding timelines and accounts with content 
designed to manipulate the user’s sense of community and reality, the Kremlin hoped to 
impact the voting behavior of that individual. These were not always overtly supporting 
Trump; more often than not, the content was engineered to draw doubt on an 
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individual’s support of Clinton or convince them to simply not participate in the 
election as a whole.114 In the three months before the election, 38 million Facebook 
posts with disinformation were shared and received 760 million clicks, or “about three 
stories read per American adult” each day.115 Relatively, these were only a small 
portion of the content a user viewed online; however, three stories per day for the 
average adult is a significant symbol of the sheer number of disinformation that existed 
online.  
Artificial Intelligence, Trolls, and the Internet Research Agency 
To achieve such a significant high caliber of content generation, the Russian 
government relied upon the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a quasigovernmental 
organization with close ties to the Kremlin. The IRA hired hundreds of Russian hackers 
to act as online trolls, crafted fake news stories and spread disinformation on Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. While the full extent of the IRA’s reach on these 
platforms is still unknown, Facebook reports that the IRA’s political posts reached 140 
million Facebook users leading up to the 2016 election.116 The IRA worked in 
conjunction with Russian business leaders, government operatives, and cybersecurity 
professionals to spread disinformation on the widest scale in modern history.  
The IRA used several different methods to share disinformation. First, it created 
over 140 U.S. political websites, including WorldPoliticus.com, TrumpVision365.com, 
USConservativeToday.com, and USADailyPolitics.com.117 These sites generated 
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hundreds of thousands of views in 2016 and published many of the fake news articles 
spread within American cyberspace.118 Additionally, the IRA placed 3,400 
advertisements for Trump on Facebook, valuing at $100,000.119 But most shocking of 
all was the quantity of social media posts from the Russian troll accounts. In the six 
months before the election, Russian-linked accounts posted 61,500 posts on Facebook, 
116,000 photos on Instagram, and 10.4 million tweets on Twitter.120  
The accounts linked back to IRA Russian trolls were often automated by 
artificial intelligence bots. In a study by the Oxford Internet Institute, AI troll accounts 
“reached positions of measurable influence” by closely learning the habits and interests 
of users and crafting content to better appeal to those individuals.121 These “did 
infiltrate the upper cores of influence and were thus in a position to significantly 
influence digital communications during the 2016 election” to the point where Russian 
disinformation was “almost completely bounded by highly automated accounts, with a 
high degree of overall automation.”122 The bot accounts primarily reshared 
disinformation posts of other Russian-operated users, which generated even greater 
traction within the various social media algorithms. For many of these platforms, the 
algorithms are designed to cycle through trending media posts, thereby sharing content 
that has already been deemed as ‘interesting’ through the digital interactions by a wider 
audience.123  
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Sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were flooded with disinformation 
posts. Automated troll accounts produced 25 to 30 times more content than real news 
accounts, inundating social media platforms with inflammatory, extremist, and 
aggressive views.124 These posts containing disinformation also were 70 percent more 
likely to be retweeted than reliable news stories.125 In the month before the election, 
Twitter identified 50,000 bot accounts linked to Russian servers that shared only 
election-related content.126 The real amount is estimated to be much higher.  
Despite the difference in audiences, similar trends followed all of the messaging. 
In right-wing cyberspheres, disinformation focused on the quantity of illegal 
immigration, xenophobia and Islamic terrorism, and an assault on Christian values. 
Much of the rhetoric perpetuated fears of an assault on law enforcement and veterans, 
as well as an awareness of Black nationalism and continuing social justice movements. 
Meanwhile, left-leaning profiles spread that Clinton rigged the primary against Bernie 
Sanders, that she was anti-Black, and corrupted by Wall Street. They shared her history 
of supporting incarceration legislation and claimed she would perpetuate 
institutionalized racism.127  
The disinformation itself that was spread reached a wide audience and was 
intended to appear reliable. On Facebook, a story that Trump was endorsed by Pope 
Francis received over 960,000 shares, reactions, and comments.128 A story that Clinton 
sold weapons to ISIS engaged with 789,000 accounts.129 “Blacktivist,” a Facebook 
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group created by IRA trolls that appeared as a community for Black social justice 
activists, generated over 500,000 followers and outpaced the growth of the official 
Black Lives Matter account.130  
 
Figure 2: Ad from the “Blacktivist” celebrating Colin Kaepernick’s birthday with over 
12,000 reactions and almost 6,000 shares.131  
The posts were designed simply, thereby easier for users to quickly share and process 
without significant consideration of its content. 
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Figure 3: Ad from “Heart of Texas” claiming that Clinton had a 69 percent disapproval 
rating from veterans.132  
An advertisement by “Heart of Texas,” a Russian Facebook page, claimed that Clinton 
had a 69 percent disapproval rating. This was false, and a piece of disinformation used 
against Clinton on a page with over 250,000 members.  
                                                        





Figure 4: “South United” which had over 130,000 community members.133 
Many of the groups were focused on national identity, like “South United.” These 
Facebook groups planned real events, shared disinformation, and allowed users to 
interact with one another continuously. These echo chambers spiraled into communities 
where like-minded individuals were fueled by disinformation designed to garner 
enraged and extreme reactions.134   
 These bot accounts also shared Russian propaganda from state-operated media 
agencies. RT, formerly known as Russia Today, had an influx of American views 
leading up to the 2016 election. RT contributed to the cult-like following of Trump by 
focusing primarily on negative Clinton news, widely exploiting her leaked emails and 
accusations of corruption. Trump was hailed as a pioneer for American values, who 
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would seemingly rebuild the American legacy and work with Putin to establish a global 
dominance of power. For the first time, RT became one of the most shared accounts in 
American social media.135  
 
Figure 5: RT’s engagement leading up to the election. On YouTube, RT surpassed the 
views of many other accredited global media outlets.136  
While working in conjunction with the IRA, RT aired documentaries, news segments, 
and strategically oriented talk shows focused on volatile current events in the US. These 
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stories fueled partisan tensions, particularly in the right-wing social media spheres that 
the Russian bot accounts shared them in.137  
 Despite an awareness of these automated troll accounts after the 2016 election 
results, the IRA-owned accounts merely intensified their activity after the election. 
Instagram posts each month increased by 238 percent, Facebook by 69 percent, Twitter 
by 52 percent, and YouTube by 84 percent.138 When testifying before Congress, John 
Kelly, a social media researcher, described that  
after election day, the Russian government stepped on the gas. Accounts 
operated by the IRA troll farm became more active after the election, 
confirming again that the assault on our democratic process is much 
bigger than the attack on a single election.139  
The American government may be acutely attuned to these disinformation schemes, and 
the American public may be somewhat aware of what is occurring in our cyberspaces, 
but the damage is only continuing. Even with Congressional attention and federal 
investigations, Russia’s information warfare remains insidiously unraveling partisanship 
and comradery in the public sphere. 
The 2016 Victims of Disinformation Warfare 
The electoral college makes every U.S. Presidential election a game. Candidates 
must secure 270 electoral college votes to win the presidency, which often results in a 
concentrated focus on swing state turnout. While most states tend to historically fall into 
a voting pattern of red or blue, states like Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin, Ohio, and North Carolina are battlegrounds for each candidate. The 2016 
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election was no different; Trump won the presidency because he secured Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ohio, leaving him with 304 electoral college votes over 
Clinton’s 227.140  
 
Figure 6: 2016 election results.141 
By all accounts, polling suggested that Clinton was a clear favorite to secure 
most battleground states. They were populated with Black and Latinx voters, who 
traditionally leaned left, and young college-educated voters, who vastly supported 
Bernie Sanders in the primary and were predicated to vote blue.142 But political pundits 
and Clinton’s campaign were shocked to see the voter results, with scores of veterans 
and evangelicals outvoting young liberals. These were the same demographics targeted 
by Russian disinformation schemes.  
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Mobilizing Evangelicals and Veterans 
While evangelicals and veterans traditionally supported Republican candidates, 
the Trump campaign feared neither demographic would turn out to vote. In early 2016, 
evangelicals were not expected to comprehensively support Trump. The Pew Research 
Center found that 44 percent of white evangelical voters discredited his candidacy, as 
Trump was “not at all religious.” 55 percent were dissatisfied with the choice of 
presidential candidates, and 42 percent agreed that “it will be difficult to choose 
between Trump and Clinton because neither one would make a good president.”143 
Meanwhile, veterans showed a lack of enthusiasm for Trump, as he only led by 10 
points over Clinton—in 2012, Mitt Romney outperformed Barack Obama by 20 
points.144  
To win Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Trump had to ensure 
evangelicals and veterans arrived in droves to the polls. This was safeguarded by the 
rhetoric in Russian-backed disinformation social media accounts. Groups like “South 
United” and “Heart of Texas,” both Facebook communities with veterans and religious 
voters from across the United States, featured media with Bible quotes, religious 
imagery, and anti-Clinton articles describing her hatred towards the military. RT videos 
that claimed Clinton was corrupt and anti-Christian were circulated in these spheres, as 
well as articles posted on Russian-backed conservative news outlets. One post on 
Facebook claimed that, “at least 50,000 homeless veterans are starving dying in the 
streets, but liberals want to invite 620,000 refugees and settle them among us.”145 A 
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Russian Instagram account, “American.veterans,” posted an image of a crying woman 
that was viewed over 17,654 times, writing that “Killary Clinton will never understand 
what it feels like to lose the person you love for the sake of your country.”146  
Inflammatory posts, similar to these, were concentrated in Philadelphia, Detroit, 
and Milwaukee in an effort to increase voter turnout for religious conservatives. In the 
months leading to the election, posts increased tenfold. Ultimately, 81 percent of 
evangelicals and 60 percent of veterans voted for Trump in 2016, two demographics in 
which he outperformed all of the previous Republican candidates in the past 20 years.147 
While this turnout certainly helped Trump win the election, it was more of an insurance 
policy. Russian operatives’ greater victory was using disinformation to suppress 
millions of votes.   
Disenfranchising Black Voters 
Since 1996, Black voters have historically remained one of the largest 
demographics to turn out and vote in each election, despite constant efforts of the 
Republican party to suppress them. While white voter turnout consistently fell, Black 
turnout was the opposite; non-Hispanic white voters fell from 67.2% in 2004 to 64.1% 
in 2012.148 Meanwhile, Black voters increased from 60% to 66.2%, and thereby 
surpassing white voter turnout.149 But in 2016, Black voters fell to 59.4%, the lowest it 
had been since 2000, while every other demographic increased.150  
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Black communities were drowned in disinformation online leading up to the 
election. The “Blacktivist” Facebook group generated 11.2 million interactions in the 
six months before the 2016 election, and the “Woke Blacks” page was viewed over 
307,000 times.151 Many of these accounts touched on Clinton’s “super predator” 
characterization from 1996, as well as the extreme increase of Black incarceration after 
Bill Clinton’s administration. Fake ads were shared to voters of color encouraging them 
to vote from home or not cast a ballot at all. One Russian user posted “no one represents 
Black people. Don’t go to vote. Only this way we can change the way of things…” 
which was interacted with 8,500 times.152 The “Woke Blacks” page told its followers 
that “We’d surely be better off without voting AT ALL” because “A particular hype and 
hatred for Trump is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary. We 
cannot resort to the lesser of two devils.”153  
During the Federal investigations into the Russian disinformation attacks, 
Congress determined that Black voters were targeted at an exponentially greater extent 
than any other group. The Committee:  
found that no single group of Americans was targeted by IRA 
information operatives more than African Americans. By far, race and 
related issues were the preferred target of the information warfare 
campaigns designed to divide the country in 2016.154 
The Mueller investigation came to the same conclusion. Ultimately, Trump’s margin of 
victory was reduced to three counties in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, all of 
which were counties with high populations of color.   
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2012 to 2016 in 
key counties 
Michigan 2,268,839 2,279,543 10,704 Wayne County: 
76,402 
Pennsylvania 2,926,441 2,970,733 44,292 Philadelphia 
County: 4,781 
Wisconsin 1,382536 1,405,284 22,748 Milwaukee 
County: 43,616 
Election results by state.155 
The Democratic vote fell drastically in three counties which Clinton narrowly lost and 
Obama dominated in 2012. And in two of these three states, Trump’s margin of victory 
equates the difference in voter turnout in that same county. Had Clinton performed as 
expected, she would have won all three states and the election itself. Instead, 
evangelical Christian and veteran voters overperformed, and Black representation 
sharply declined. Consequentially, the same demographics encouraged to stay home and 
not vote by IRA disinformation drastically fell in turnout rates as well. 
From Sanders to Stein 
The third demographic significantly targeted were young, college-educated 
liberals. The Mueller indictment described that the IRA specifically attempted to enrage 
former Sanders supporters through an incessant stream of content alleging that Clinton 
rigged the primaries, that the Democratic Party manipulated the results, and that Bernie 
                                                        




Sanders was set up to fail because of Clinton’s financial corruption within the DNC.156 
Young liberals were encouraged to either stay home and not vote or vote for third-party 
candidate Jill Stein. RT shared videos describing Stein as a likely alternative to Clinton, 
one which stood a chance at winning the election.157   
The Stein rhetoric was spread throughout disinformation bots. The “Blacktivist” 
Facebook page posted “Choose peace and vote for Jill Stein,” which received 18,888 
impressions.158 A commentor, whose account was also linked to a Russian bot, replied 
“trust me, it’s not a wasted vote…. The only way to take our country back is to stop 
voting for the corporations and banks that own us.”159 Additionally, RT posted more 
than 100 stories on-air and online supporting Stein, even interviewing her personally.160 
Many of the left-leaning progressive social media communities which these were 
disseminated through also witnessed stories that claimed Clinton was involved with Al-
Qaeda and armed ISIS, exploited the Benghazi incident, and perpetuated the fake news 
report that she ran a pedophile ring in a Washington, D.C. pizza shop.161  
Not only did these voters support Stein in the election, but some of them even 
flipped and voted for Trump. 12 percent of voters who supported Sanders in the primary 
voted for Trump in November—most of these switches were concentrated in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.162 Additionally, while voters 18-29 years old had the 
most supporters for Sanders in the primaries, they also had the lowest turnout rate in the 
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2016 election as a whole.163 According to a study from The Cooperative Congressional 
Election Committee, “four out of every five Obama-to-nonvoters identify as Democrats, 
and 83 percent reported they would have voted for a Democrat down-ballot” had they 
voted.164  
These disinformation schemes worked in perfect harmony with each other and 
necessitated a delicate political environment to succeed. By embedding distrust and 
infuriation within right-wing communities, disenfranchising Black voters, and 
indoctrinating young progressives with pro-Stein literature, Russia and the Internet 
Research Agency capitalized on an already fragile political ecosystem in the United 
Stattes. On November 8, 2016, white conservatives arrived in droves at the ballot box, 
prepared to defend their country from a corrupted, anti-military politician entrenched in 
the Washington swamp. Meanwhile, Black voters and young progressives in 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin remained home or cast a ballot for Sein. All 
three groups were unreservedly unaware that their trusted timelines and social media 
communities were riddled with disinformation and fake news engineered to illicit their 
exact reactions.  
Collusion? Connections to the Trump Campaign 
 Currently, it is still unknown if the Trump campaign colluded with Russia and 
the Internet Research Agency in 2016. The Mueller investigation was unable to come to 
a formal conclusion to the criminality of Trump’s connections with the Kremlin, but 
federal investigations are still ongoing. Several key individuals in the campaign have 
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admitted to meeting with Russian officials, including Donald J. Trump Jr., Paul 
Manafort, Jared Kushner, Jeff Sessions, and Michael T. Flynn. Sessions recused himself 
from the federal investigation after it was revealed he lied during his confirmation 
hearing, originally claiming that he never communicated with the Russians during the 
campaign despite later admitting to meeting with Sergey Kislyak, Russia’s former 
ambassador to the United States. Manafort plead guilty to conspiracy to launder money 
and failure to register as a foreign agent, as he was allegedly paid millions of dollars by 
Russian operatives as an unregistered lobbyist. Richard Gates, a key operative in 
Trump’s campaign, also admitted to defrauding the United States during the election 
and lying to federal investigators.165  
 While much remains unknown, it is clear that Putin’s and Trump’s interests 
were aligned throughout the campaign. Russia began disseminating disinformation 
through its troll accounts during the Republican primaries, working within conservative 
groups online to discredit Ted Cruz and Jeb Bush.166 And despite what Trump’s 
adversaries may claim, their campaign exploited the same groups as the Russians while 
working with the computer research consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica.  
Like the Internet Research Agency, Cambridge Analytica relied on artificial 
intelligence and social media data to profoundly learn how most American voters 
behaved. This was characterized as microtargeting: using hundreds of data points to 
master what a user needs to hear to vote a certain way. Cambridge Analytica 
coordinated the spread of Russian disinformation using its microtargeting schemes and 
utilized the algorithms within each social media platform to better disseminate the 
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disinformation on a wider scale. Cambridge Analytica, while working for the Trump 
campaign, used the data of over 50 million Facebook users to microtarget Russian 
disinformation to each user.167 While Cambridge Analytica may now be defunct, their 
microtargeting shared disinformation-based ads to billions of viewers, resulting in a 
“Google manipulation” unlike any other communication method used in a political 
campaign ever before.168  
So, Was the Election Rigged?  
 Like everything else in contemporary society, technology has shattered the 
norms defining election manipulation. The public sphere has merged into cyberspace, 
and it is impossible to separate a successful political campaign from its manipulated 
digital strategy. It may be unclear what, if any, impact the Russian trolls had on the 
election results itself. While specific votes were not tampered with or altered, there is no 
denying the influence Russian information warfare had on the American public in 2016. 
The sheer amount of disinformation, designed to illicit inflammatory and divisive 
reactions, contributed to a political climate that was partisan, radical, and incredibly 
sensitive. 
 Social media is powerful not because it forces people to act in certain ways, but 
because it influences them to. Digital communities have become, to many, more reliable 
and comforting than the humans they interact with daily. Many of us learn about the 
news, discover new ideas, meet new people, sustain ourselves, and find consolation 
through the Internet. We have been conditioned to appreciate and depend upon what we 
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see online, because we believe that our digital neighborhoods are our true friends and 
trusted communities. This is what defines the 21st century human experience.  
 In 2016, the Russian government used this against the American public. Aware 
that most users accept what is presented to them online as factual, the IRA engineered 
media to convince Americans of a fake reality. This reality was seemingly no different 
than our normal interactions with content and users online, but was designed to 
manipulate our behavior, to motivate us to act in a way we believed to be normal and 
right. And in the end, we acted just as they predicted us to.  
 What happened in 2016 may not have been a traditional act of war, but it was 
still an attack on the American public. These disinformation accounts resulted in 
increased political animosity, polarization, and radicalism across the country, and they 
also elected a President who was all but endorsed by Putin. Russia had a long and 
extensive history of influencing elections to help its own interests; the 2016 election 




VII. The New Normal? 
The 2016 election was only a premonition of what is to come. As technology 
continues evolving at a radical rate and machine learning capabilities innovate 
exponentially, technology will only make it easier to act nefariously, be it by a private 
individual or foreign adversary. Since 2016, more than 80% of the disinformation troll 
Twitter accounts are still active, publishing more than a million tweets each day.169 And 
despite a national awareness of Russian election interference, little has been done to 
amend the crimes. Is this the new normal? Or can technology be reformed to promote 
digital civility and justice? 
The 2020 Election 
 After Trump’s victory in 2016, the American public was warned against 
continued attempts to influence the election with disinformation. Many of the Russian 
troll accounts were still active and posting fervidly against Joe Biden.170 These bots 
shifted their message from 2016 in response to the current political climate, often 
attempting to prevent voters from using mail-in ballots, or by instructing liberal 
communities that they could submit their mail-in ballot later than their state actually 
accepted. Some communities received robocalls produced by Russian operatives, with 
one even claiming that  
did you know that if you vote by mail your personal information will be 
part of a public database that will be used by police departments to track 
down old warrants and be used by credit card companies to collect 
outstanding debts? Don’t be finessed into giving your private 
information to the man. Stay safe and beware of vote-by-mail.171  
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There were also reports that ballot drop-boxes were changed, QR codes had been 
altered, or that deadlines were switched for voters to submit their ballots. All of these 
were traced back to malicious foreign adversaries attempting to sway the election.  
 However, the nation was focusing its attention on domestic-based 
disinformation, rather than foreign interference. QAnon, a conspiracy movement that 
originated as an online forum in 2019, claimed to utilize a similar method of 
information warfare employed by the Russians in 2016. However, QAnon relabeled 
these tactics as “meme warfare,” with one user describing that  
part of the 2020 memewar NEEDS to be strategically targeting these 
now VERY VULNERABLE democrats with memes so that not only are 
they voted out of office but democrats lose the House… Don’t forget that 
we are waging an information war, and this and the 2020 memewar are 
part of it.172 
By rebranding Russian information warfare into a more niche and effective scheme, 
QAnon reclaimed this form of digital terrorism and made it more impactful and 
community oriented. In February 2020, even Trump retweeted QAnon accounts over 70 
times, once even 20 times in one day.173  
A majority of Americans were unable to identify disinformation that was 
embedded by QAnon during the election. One-third of Americans believed that Joe 
Biden wielded voter fraud schemes against conservatives to win the election, a 
widespread conspiracy theory spread by QAnon supporters.174 40% of Americans 
argued that COVID-19 was created by Chinese operatives to gain global power.175 And 
47% thought that the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests were overtly violent, despite 
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significant testimony arguing the opposite.176 And as QAnon garners more national 
support, 39% of Americans believe that Trump is undermined by a deep state comprised 
by the political elite, including Obama, Clinton, and Biden.177  
While foreign disinformation efforts did not win Trump the presidency in 2020, 
they did not disappear from national politics either. In July 2020, American intelligence 
officials reported that China, Russia, and Iran were all attempting to influence the 2020 
election results in a similar manner to 2016.178 Russia and Iran were accused of 
“spread[ing] disinformation in the U.S.” to “undermine confidence in our democratic 
process” on social media.179 Chinese officials were accused of using disinformation to 
“shape the policy environment in the United States” based on China’s interests.180 As of 
April 2021, the details of these three campaigns, and which politician they worked to 
elect, remain classified information without much public awareness. However, they 
indicate a growing interest of state governments to utilize emerging technology in 
foreign elections—a trend that could change the way the Web is governed forever.  
 Disinformation is a major threat to the American democracy, regardless of who 
is wielding it. When utilized properly, it can erode the fabric of our electoral system and 
promote widespread chaos and corruption. But what can be done to safeguard our 
democratic processes? Has technology evolved to an unmaintainable point?  
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Can Anything Be Done?  
Today, it is clear that the Russian government utilized American social media 
platforms for the widest spread of disinformation in modern history. More individuals 
are growing apprehensive to the power social media companies have in their lives and 
started interrogating how much influence these cyber communities should have in their 
lives, and in society as a whole. The American democracy was founded on a belief that 
every individual, regardless of political affiliation or personal beliefs, should be entitled 
to equitable liberties. Foreign interference and manipulation of our communication 
systems seizes autonomy from every American who experiences disinformation, and 
something must be done to better protect the American public of information warfare. 
As technology evolves and transforms, data and private information will only become 
more valuable within an economy that operates off of data-based technology.  
Artificial intelligence poses a massive and existential threat to democracy. The 
2016 election is just a starting point; as technology and machine learning advance, new 
tools will be used by adversaries to erode the American public sphere. As Elaine 
Kamarack stated,  
when applied to the actions of governments, many AI innovations are 
positive; for instance, who would not want faster and better emergency 
response systems? But when the same technologies are applied to the 
messy world of politics, the potential for mischief equals or exceeds the 
potential for good.181 
Even recently, facial recognition algorithms can manipulate videos to perfectly align 
people with audio clips from entirely new videos, convincing viewers that the person 
said something completely different—and altering their reality. And social media 
                                                        




companies have done little, if anything, to correct the wrongs from 2016. No algorithms 
have been changed, no new policies implemented, so is there anything that can be done 
to fix what went wrong? 
 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a political scientist from the University of 
Pennsylvania, argues that journalism norms must be reformed to rebuild trust in the 
media. With more reliable media sources, the public will be less inundated by fake news 
and disinformation.182 While this is a worthwhile argument—trust in journalism should 
be restored, regardless—it does little to account for the responsibility of the tech 
companies creating the algorithms designed to entrench users. Under Jamieson’s model, 
Americans will rely upon local journalists and media sources, but still be vulnerable to 
high-quality disinformation, like what was used in 2016.  
 Others, like Elaine Kamarck from the Brookings Institution, emphasizes the 
reformation of political parties as the linchpin to solving the disinformation crisis. If 
campaigns simply stop using foreign operatives of disinformation schemes to advertise 
their candidate, then significantly less fake news will be circulated online. Campaigns 
that do not follow these guidelines will be sanctioned or criminalized, ultimately 
placing the burden on each candidate to ensure they are playing by the rules.183 What 
Kamarack fails to consider, however, is how this will do little to prevent foreign 
interference in elections. Even today, four years after the 2016 election, the federal 
government is still unable to determine if Trump played a role in Russia’s electoral 
attack. If little evidence can corroborate this connection, then it is highly unlikely that a 
political party will be willing to identify, if it can identify at all, their candidate’s 
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collusion with a foreign power. Regardless of how vigilant the Democratic or 
Republican parties may be, sanctions will do little to deter foreign officials committed 
to furthering their interests.  
 Unfortunately, in the world of tech policy, it is impossible to regulate innovation 
before invention. While some policies, like Section 230 of the Stored Communications 
Act, may improve over time and find additional applications in new political discourses, 
the government is unable to research, draft, and pass tech policy before the technology 
itself has been disseminated on a broad scale. While policy to protect civil society from 
electronic disinformation would be ideal, its likely improbable within the near future. 
 Tech norms must shift to begin enacting systemic change. Historically, a line 
has always divided consumers from citizens—but technology is erasing that line. Users 
must be protected through national policy, ethical technology, and algorithms that 
promote transparency and autonomy. This norm would promote just practices and 
prevent disenfranchisement across civil society.184 Companies throughout the tech 
industry, from social media platforms to automated employment software companies, 
utilize algorithms to streamline almost every output. Even local governments have used 
algorithms to identify accurate bail and parole decisions, as well as to decide police 
assignments.185 While these algorithms make work easier, they are also landmines for 
misbehavior and abuse. Ethical algorithms should be mainstreamed to ensure the tech 
industry promotes and advocates for fairness, regardless of who may be using their 
devices. By reforming the algorithms operating the sites, disinformation will be less 
likely to spread, and cyberspace will become more fruitful and equitable as a whole.  
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 Experts working in technology ethics agree that norms must shift to prioritize 
data privacy. By rebuilding community standards, both technology companies and 
governments will have a clearer role with prioritizing the digital rights of every user. 
This can only be achieved through a regulation of technology, enacting new tech 
policies, creating legal boundaries, and establishing systemic ethical practices for large 
companies.186 Reforming AI and machine learning necessitates federal guidance and 
formal legal boundaries, but norms cannot be legislated either. All four components 
must be achieved to address ethical issues arising from technological change.187  
  Additionally, tech companies, like Facebook and Twitter, must be held 
accountable for the harm they caused in 2016. Despite being passive throughout the 
election, research shows that executives at Facebook and Twitter were complicit in 
aiding the IRA with information to perfect their strategies of disseminating 
disinformation, primarily through a detailed description of the operating algorithms.188 
As Big Tech companies, like Facebook and Amazon, continue to grow, they entrench 
the industry with monopolies and corruption. In order to promote fairness and 
transparency, Big Tech companies involved in the 2016 election interferences must be 
regulated and found liable for their passive role they played in the disinformation 
warfare.  
Without competition, Big Tech companies will only grow bigger and more 
powerful, thereby controlling more of cyberspace than they do now.189 Most recently, 
Twitter and Amazon were scrutinized for silencing QAnon supporters after the January 
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6th Capitol Hill unrest—while these censors calmed many who were concerned over the 
growing influence of alt-right conspiracy theories, it also concerned tech policy 
professionals fearful of unlimited power for Big Tech. When there is no line drawn 
limiting the power of industry giants, the government must draw that line.190 Only then 
will tech companies and social media platforms begin protecting their users against data 
hacks and disinformation tactics.191  
 Finally, the fight against foreign disinformation must be undertaken globally. 
For decades, Russian operatives worked to wield disinformation against burgeoning 
democracies and its political adversaries. Recently, more countries have begun to do the 
same, with the federal government reporting Iranian and Chinese interference in the 
2020 election.192 Without reformed global norms preventing cyber and information 
attacks, these infiltration schemes will only proliferate. Just like the norms that delineate 
warfare and economic relations, some form of international guideline must be 
established to normalize digital transparency and cyber freedoms. Without it, states will 
only continue to utilize technology to perpetuate their interests, despite what it might 
cost another country.  
 What happened in 2016 should scare the American public, but it should also 
motivate lawmakers to establish formidable norms promoting digital liberties through 
policy and partnerships. Technology’s impact on civil society has long been ignored by 
policy makers and technological scholars, but with an ever-blurring line between the 
two, a reckoning impends over Washington, D.C. and Silicon Valley. All citizens are 
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now consumers, and all consumers are owed a burden of care from their retailers. Until 
tech companies are held accountable to reformed norms, Russian disinformation 
warfare will only evolve through new technologies and innovation. The 2016 election 
may have been tampered with, but until we protect our cyberspace, every election that is 
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